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Abstract / Résumé
Using data from the NLSY (1979-1991) and from the Panel Study of
IncomeDynamics (PSID, 1981-1987), we seek to determine whether there is any
net positive return to tenure with the current employer once we control for
industry-specific capital. Using data from the PSID, Topel (JPE 1991) concluded
that 10 years of seniority with an employer translated into a net return of about
25%. However, once we include total experience in the industry as an additional
explanatory variable, the return to seniority vanishes almost completely when we
use either OLS, GLS or IV-GLS estimation methods, although this conclusion
varies somewhat according to the occupation, some occupation classes showing
a negative net return to tenure and others showing a positive net return. Note
also that this result holds whether the analysis is carried out at the 1-digit, 2-
digit or 3-digit level. Therefore, it seems that what matters most for the wage
profile in terms of human capital is not so much firm-specificity but industry-
specificity.
Avec les données du NLSY ainsi que celles du Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), on cherche à déterminer sil y a un rendement positif net lié à
lancienneté dans la firme. Topel (JPE 1991) a montré avec un échantillon du PSID
lexistence dun rendement substantiel (25 % en 10 ans). Toutefois, du moment
que lon inclut lexpérience dans lindustrie courante dans léquation de salaire (en
plus de lancienneté dans la firme ainsi que lexpérience totale de travail), leffet
dancienneté disparaît presque complètement, que lon estime par simples moindres
carrés généralisés ou par la méthode des variables instrumentales (IV-GLS), et ce,
avec les deux échantillons différents. À noter également que ce résultat est robuste
au degré dagrégation des classes dindustries.
See also Neal (1993) for a different approach to assessing the degree of industry-specificity.1
For a theoretical model that describes the wage (price) formation process in the presence of renegotiation2
and relation-specific investments, see MacLeod and Malcomson (1993a,b). Under certain conditions and
when proper allowance is made for the possibility of contract renegotiation, they show that employers need
not offer their workers above market-clearing wages.
The response rate was at 71% in 1991.3
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I. Introduction
The extent to which wages rise with years of seniority with the same
employer has been the subject of some controversy over the last few years (e.g Topel
(1991); Altonji and Shakotko (1987); Abraham and Farber (1987), Abowd, Kramarz
and Margolis (1994)). Much of the debate surrounding this issue has focused on the
appropriate econometric methods to be used to handle the issue of the endogeneity of
the tenure variable. However, virtually no attention has been paid to the question of
whether it is appropriate to decompose a workers total labor market experience into
only two components, tenure with the current employer and total prior experience (or
total experience including tenure if one wants to obtain the latters net effect). With
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), it is shown that simply by adding total experience
in the current industry as an additional explanatory variable, the net tenure effect
vanishes almost completely. This suggests that past studies (most notably Topel
(1991)) have overlooked an important factor in analyzing the effect of tenure on
wages. It is worth noting that this result holds when the analysis is carried out either
at the one-digit, two-digit, or three-digit level. Therefore, it seems that what matters
most for the wage profile in terms of human capital is not so much firm-specificity but
industry-specificity.1
These results lead to the following basic conclusion: for these two samples
of workers, the wage formation process seems to be very competitive with no solid
evidence of rent sharing over the return on firm-specific capital. Or, put in the
language of bargaining theory, there is little evidence that the workers represented in
these two samples are paid much in excess of their outside option.2
II. The Data
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data set surveyed 12,686 young
males and females who were between the age of 14 and 21 in 1979 . It contains3
detailed employment histories of the respondents thereby permitting the construction
The choice of six years as a cutoff point is arbitrary, and hence debatable. The idea is to exclude those that4
make quasi-permanent transitions and who might be considering returning to school a few years down
the road. It seems reasonable to assume that few people would enter the labor market while planning to
leave it in six years or more to go back to school. The same could not be said if we were considering a one
to three year (say) horizon. In any event, the results were left unchanged if all school returners were
excluded.
This PSID extract was kindly supplied by Robert Valetta who used it in his paper with David Brownstone5
(Brownstone and Valetta (1993)) on the modeling of measurement error bias in wage equations.
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of relatively error-free variables for tenure as well as for the total experience
accumulated since the beginning of ones full time transition to the labor market. At
the time this project was started, data were available from 1979 to 1991.
The people who were considered as having entered the labor market on a
full-time basis were (i) those whose primary activity was either working full-time, on
a temporary lay-off or looking actively for a job, (ii) those who did not return to school
on a full-time basis within six years and (iii) those who had worked at least half the4
year since the last interview and who were working at least 20 hours per week.
Individuals excluded from the sample are those younger than 18, those that had been
in the military at any time, the self-employed, the ones whose jobs were part of a
government program and the ones working without pay, those who were in the
farming business and also all public sector employees. We are then left with 29,020
observations. Some summary statistics of the sample are provided in table 1.
Turning now to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the sample
consists of heads of households aged 18 to 64 with positive earnings for the period
spanning the years 1981-1987. The question of whether people have entered the labor5
market on a full-time basis is obviously less of a concern for this sample of older
workers. Summary statistics are provided in table 2.
III. Results
III.1 Basic Model.
Consider the following log wage equation:
4(2)
where w represents the real hourly wage of person i in job j in industry k at time t,ijkt
T is tenure, Exp is total labor market experience and Expind is total experience in the
current industry. Specifically, the variable experience in the industry gives the
consecutive number of years one has been in the same industry excluding tenure with
the current employer. For example, if a worker leaves her first employer to take
another job in the same industry, she adds experience in that industry, whereas if she
takes another job in a different industry, her seniority in the industry is accordingly
reset to zero. An implicit assumption is that the worker stays in the same industry
throughout her employment relationship with a particular employer (the data show that
this is not always the case: there are workers who change industry while not changing
employers). Still, despite its shortcomings, this variable should give a fairly good idea
of the industry effects embedded in the tenure variable. All other covariates, including
squared terms for tenure, total experience and industry experience, are ignored for
ease of presentation. As in previous studies, unobserved heterogeneity can be
decomposed into an individual effect ( " ) and a job-match effect ( 2 ). The person-i ij
specific effect can be seen as representing unmeasured aspects of each individuals
earning ability while the job-match component represents the unknown (to the
econometrician) quality of the employment relationship stemming from search activity,
for example. Both of these effects are assumed to be time-invariant. Another
unobserved heterogeneity component, ( , which serves the same purpose as the job-ik
match component, is added to represent the unobserved quality of the match between
the individual and the industry in which he works.
As emphasized in the literature, the problem in estimating equation (1) with
ordinary least-squares is that the unobserved components are likely to be correlated
with tenure, total labor market experience and also, in our case, total experience in the
industry. Those with high "s may have enjoyed careers that were interrupted less
frequently by unemployment spells, while better matches (high 2s and high (s) are
likely to be formed if you have more experience due to human capital and search
effects. Also, tenure and total experience in the current industry are likely to be
correlated with their corresponding match quality components. Dropping for the
moment the assumption of time-invariant job-match and industry-match components,
lets suppose that we can write them as
For simplicity, I also assume that total experience in the industry is not correlated with the job-match6
component while tenure is not correlated with the unobserved quality of the match in the industry. One
could argue that more experience in the industry may help you find a better job-match because of superior
information in comparison to a worker who has never worked in the industry.
See also Finnie (1993) for an extension of the method of Altonji and Shakotko to the experience variable.7
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(3)
where T and 0 are assumed to be orthogonal to the regressors. The discussionijt ikt
6
above suggests thatR and n are positive. In the context of maximizing behavior on2 2
the part of a worker who faces a wage distribution, Topel(1991) argues that R is1
negative once we control for experience, assuming there is a tenure effect. If there is
no tenure effect, then R equals zero. Presumably, the same sort of considerations1
apply to n . That is, provided that we control for total labor market experience, the3
quality of the match in the industry should be negatively correlated with the number
of years one has been in the same industry. Substituting equation (2) into equation (1)
we get
We see from equation (3) that although we are interested in the $s, using ordinary
least-squares will produce estimates of composite effects and the regressors would still
be correlated with ". To provide some correction for these problems, I use the
instrumental variable (IV) methodology proposed by Altonji and Shakotko (1987) .7
Tenure is instrumented with its deviations from job-match means whereas experience
is instrumented with its deviations from individual means. In the same spirit, total
experience in the industry is instrumented with its deviations from industry-match
means. The instruments for tenure and experience in the industry are, by construction,
uncorrelated with their respective match quality components, while the instrument for
experience is, also by construction, uncorrelated with the individual component. First
differences (as in Topel (91)) were not used to obtain a consistent estimate of the sum
of the tenure and experience coefficients, because this would enhance any
measurement errors present in the data as compared with using deviations from
means. This is further justified by Topels observation that much of the discrepancy
between his results and those of Altonji and Shakotko stemmed from measurement
errors pertaining to the tenure variable.
Finally, since the same individuals are followed over time, residuals will be
serially correlated due to the presence of a fixed individual effect. To provide
All results are obtained using the weighted samples.8
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correction for this problem, all regressions are done using generalized least-squares
under the assumption that the error term contains an individual-specific component.
III.2 Earnings Equation Estimates.
I now turn to the question of disentangling industry effects from purely firm-
specific effects. Note that the analysis is carried out at the 1-digit, 2 digit, and 3-digit8
levels. If the tenure effect is entirely firm-specific, then it should not matter whether
you change industry or not: the tenure coefficient should not budge at all. On the other
hand, if a portion of the tenure effect reflects the specificity of the human capital
acquired on the current job relative to the industry in which the firm operates, then
adding such a control should decrease the coefficient on tenure. Using the NLSY data,
the results shown in tables 3 and 4 seem to validate the latter explanation: in the GLS
specification of the 1-digit case (column (4) in table 3), over 50% of the effect of
tenure is accounted for by industry effects. The tenure effect further decreases in the
2-digit case and disappears completely in the 3-digit case (columns (3) and (2),
respectively). Once the instrumental variable specification is adopted (see table 4),
there is no evidence of a substantial and statistically significant positive tenure effect,
even at the 1-digit level. The entire effect is picked up by the variable representing
experience in the industry. Note that total experience is only slightly affected by the
inclusion of the new variable.
Table 5 provides a breakdown by occupational category. It could be that for
managers or professionals, firm-specific investments are more important and that
firms would prefer to pay these highly skilled individuals above their outside option
rather than to face the prospect of losing them, especially if these workers are in short
supply. The results indicate that there is a return to tenure for the category consisting
of professionals, technical workers, managers and administrators. In the GLS
specification, even after adding experience in the industry, the tenure effect is
substantial and significant. In fact, in the IV-GLS specification, the effect is larger after
adding the control for industry effects. For the next three categories of workers, the
results are similar to those obtained for the total sample: the industry effect is large and
significant while the firm effect is not. Again, it is interesting to note that total
experience is not markedly affected by the added variable. Total experience and
experience in the industry really do seem to provide complementary explanatory
power to the wage formation process.
If we admit that investment in firm-specific skills is complementary to the quality of the match, then it9
follows that older workers who have had more time to sample the job offer distribution would be better
candidates for such investments. On the question of complementarity between match quality and firm-
specific capital, see Jovanovic (1979).
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III.3 Comparison with Data from the PSID
Given that the NLSY is composed of young persons making their transition
to the labor market (the oldest individuals in 1991 were 33 years old), it could very
well be that the results above are peculiar to that data set. To be more precise,
assuming that skills which are truly firm-specific are associated more with older
workers than their younger counterparts, then the results above may not hold with a
sample of workers who have more mature careers. Therefore, to check whether9
results are robust across data sets, we have estimated the same type of equation with
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The sample consists of heads
of households aged 18 to 64 with positive earnings for the years spanning the period
1981 to 1987. Results are shown in tables 6 and 7. As shown in table 6, the impact of
including the additional explanatory variable is qualitatively the same as in the case
of the NLSY.With GLS and IV-GLS, adding the control for industry-specific capital
has the effect of reducing the tenure coefficient to close to zero. Results by
occupational categories are shown in table 8. Contrary to the results obtained with the
NLSY, there is no evidence of a return to tenure for professionnals, managers and
administrators. For clerical and unskilled workers, there is even evidence of a negative
net return to firm seniority. However, for service workers, the estimated return to
tenure is sizeable and significant, which is not the case for the NLSY sample.
Interestingly, a common denominator of the results with the PSID is that the total
experience coefficients are much smaller in comparison with those estimated with the
NLSY. Thus, it appears that as workers careers evolve, the skills they acquire are
more narrowly defined. Of course, as workers gain experience in the labor market, the
search process leads them to more satisfactory matches. Presumably then, the
opportunities for investment in more specific skills are enhanced in these better
jobs.
IV. Conclusion
With data from the NLSY, it has been shown that by controlling for workers
who change industry when they change jobs, the tenure effect is reduced by over 50%
at the 1-digit level if generalized least-squares are used, while it disappears completely
at the 3-digit level, whether it be with GLS or with the instrumental variable
methodology borrowed from Altonji and Shakotko (1987). These results generally
See Hause (1980) for a study linking the covariance of earnings to the theory of human capital.10
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hold when I subdivide the sample by occupational categories, although there is some
evidence of a tenure effect for professionals, technical workers and managers. Also,
by using data from the PSID, I have shown that these results are robust across data
sets and are not peculiar to the young NLSY workers making their full-time transition
to the labor market. The basic conclusion to be drawn from these results is that the
wage formation process seems to be very competitive for most of the workers in these
two data sets.
Having established that the average tenure slope is close to zero, an
interesting avenue for future research would be determine whether there is substantial
variance in the slopes. Results by occupational categories suggest that there is some
variability in the estimated tenure slopes. However, all research up to now has used
the assumption of fixed parameters. A more refined analysis would call upon the use
of a random coefficient model to study the covariance structure of a log-earnings
equation with proper allowance made for the randomness in the tenure and experience
profiles. Then we could determine with more confidence whether there is evidence10
of workers receiving wages above their outside option.
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TABLE 1
MEAN SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS (Weighted)-NLSY
Real Hourly Wage ($1979) 5.75
Hours Worked 41.7
Tenure 2.44
Experience 5.82
Years in School 12.44
Percentage Nonwhite 12.6
Percentage Married 44.7
Percentage Female 45.4
Age 25.1
Number of Observations 29,020
Number of Individuals 5,637
Number of Jobs 13,590
Number of Job Changes Involving:
1-Digit 2-Digit 3-Digit
a) A Change of Industry 5,085 5,613 6,552
b) No Change of Industry 2,818 2,290 1,351
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TABLE 2
MEAN SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS-PSID
Real Hourly Wage ($1979) 8.39
Hours Worked 40.0
Tenure 9.4
Experience 21.8
Years in School 12.8
Percentage Nonwhite 10.3
Percentage Married 66.9
Percentage Female 18.6
Age 34.6
Number of Observations 15,480
Number of Individuals 2,750
Number of Jobs 4,885
Number of Job Changes Involving:
1-Digit 2-Digit 3-Digit
a) A Change of Industry 1,033 1,143 1,337
b) No Change of Industry 1,071 961 767
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TABLE 3
EARNINGS FUNCTIONS ESTIMATES-NLSY: INDUSTRY VS TENURE EFFECT
(Dependent Variable: Log of Real Hourly Labor Income ($1979))
Independent Variable (1)
(GLS)
(2)
(GLS)
(3)
(GLS)
(4)
(GLS)
Tenure 0.0436 0.0013 0.0121 0.0173
(0.0029) (0.0064) (0.0049) (0.0044)
Tenure
Squared -0.0030 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0011
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Experience in Current
Industry(3-digit) - 0.0480 - -
(0.0064)
Experience in Industry
Squared(3-digit) - -0.0034 - -
(0.0006)
Experience in Current
Industry(2-digit) - - 0.0403 -
(0.0049)
Experience in Industry
Squared(2-digit) - - -0.0027 -
(0.0005)
Experience in Current
Industry(1-digit) - - - 0.0364
(0.0045)
Experience in Industry
Squared(1-digit) - - - -0.0025
(0.0004)
Total Experience 0.0779 0.0720 0.0695 0.0683
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045)
Total Experience
Squared -0.0020 -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0016
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Indust. Dummies YES YES YES YES
Occup. Dummies YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.8001 0.8018 0.8015 0.8014
Notes-Other covariates include education dummies, race, sex, regional, union coverage, marital status,
occupation, industry and year dummies. Standard errors are shown inparentheses (rounded to 0.0001
when smaller). Sample size is 29,020.
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TABLE 4
EARNINGS FUNCTIONS ESTIMATES-NLSY: INDUSTRY VS TENURE EFFECT
(Dependent Variable: Log of Real Hourly Labor Income ($1979))
Independent Variable -1
(IV-GLS)
-2
(IV-GLS)
-3
(IV-GLS)
-4
(IV-GLS)
Tenure 0.022 -0.0093 -0.0012 0.0028
(0.0041) (0.0091) (0.0069) (0.0062)
Tenure
Squared -0.0020 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Experience in Current
Industry(3-digit) - 0.0354 - -
(0.0090)
Experience in Industry
Squared(3-digit) - -0.0026 - -
(0.0008)
Experience in Current
Industry(2-digit) - - 0.0295 -
(0.0068)
Experience in Industry
Squared(2-digit) - - -0.0021 -
(0.0006)
Experience in Current
Industry(1-digit) - - - 0.0266
(0.0062)
Experience in Industry
Squared(1-digit) - - - -0.0020
(0.0005)
Total Experience 0.0955 0.0914 0.0894 0.0883
(0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0052)
Total Experience
Squared -0.0025 -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0021
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Indust. Dummies YES YES YES YES
Occup. Dummies YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.7945 0.7936 0.7949 0.7949
Notes-Unshown covariates are the same as those in table 3.
Standard errors in parentheses. Sample size is 29,020.
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TABLE 5
INDUSTRY EFFECT (1-digit) VS TENURE EFFECT BY OCCUPATIONS-NLSY
(Dependent Variable: log of Real Hourly Wages ($1979))
PROFESSIONALS, TECHNICAL WORKERS, MANAGERS AND ADMINISTRATORS
Independent Variable (1)
GLS
(2)
IV-GLS
(3)
GLS
(4)
IV-GLS
Tenure 0.0264 0.0219 0.0159 0.0291
(0.0065) (0.0082) (0.0089) (0.0114)
Tenure Squared -0.0028 -0.0030 -0.0019 -0.0032
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Total Experience 0.0980 0.1141 0.0689 0.1193
(0.0113) (0.0132) (0.0090) (0.0141)
Total Exp. Squared -0.0024 -0.0027 -0.0015 -0.0028
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Experience in Industry - - 0.0155 -0.0121
(0.0094) (0.0120)
Exp. in Industry Squared - - -0.0013 0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0010)
R-Squared 0.6794 0.6692 0.6783 0.6698
Number of Observations 6,788
CLERICAL AND UNSKILLED WORKERS
Independent Variable (1)
GLS
(2)
IV-GLS
(3)
GLS
(4)
IV-GLS
Tenure 0.0312 0.0159 0.0067 -0.0067
(0.0066) (0.0090) (0.0103) (0.0136)
Tenure Squared -0.0016 -0.0008 0.0006 0.0013
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Total Experience 0.0926 0.1009 0.0839 0.0928
(0.0107) (0.0134) (0.0111) (0.0141)
Total Exp. Squared -0.0027 -0.0029 -0.0021 -0.0025
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Experience in Industry - - 0.0328 0.0302
(0.0105) (0.0138)
Exp. in Industry Squared - - -0.0028 -0.0026
(0.0010) (0.0012)
R-Squared 0.6808 0.6619 0.6821 0.6630
Number of Observations 6,470
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TABLE 5-continued
CRAFTSMEN AND KINDREDWORKERS, OPERATIVES AND LABORERS
Independent Variable (1)
GLS
(2)
IV-GLS
(3)
GLS
(4)
IV-GLS
Tenure 0.0430 0.0157 0.0170 -0.0071
(0.0043) (0.0059) (0.0067) (0.0094)
Tenure Squared -0.0029 -0.0014 -0.0008 0.0006
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Total Experience 0.0825 0.1068 0.0741 0.0990
(0.006) (0.0080) (0.0068) (0.0083)
Total Exp. Squared -0.0023 -0.0030 -0.0019 -0.0026
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Experience in Industry - - 0.0349 0.0306
(0.0068) (0.0092)
Exp. in Industry Squared - - -0.0025 -0.0026
(0.0007) (0.0008)
R-Squared 0.7960 0.7840 0.7971 0.7848
Number of Observations 11,779
SERVICE WORKERS
Independent Variable (1)
GLS
(2)
IV-GLS
(3)
GLS
(4)
IV-GLS
Tenure 0.0420 0.0311 -0.0032 0.0047
(0.0080) (0.0115) (0.0121) (0.0183)
Tenure Squared -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0007 -0.0020
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0017)
Total Experience 0.0502 0.0682 0.0340 0.0606
(0.0114) (0.0149) (0.0116) (0.0154)
Total Exp. Squared -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Experience in Industry - - 0.0654 0.0353
(0.0121) (0.0177)
Exp. in Industry Squared - - -0.0040 -0.0023
(0.0012) (0.0015)
R-Squared 0.6878 0.6767 0.6921 0.6788
Number of Observations 3,969
Notes-Unshown covariates are the same as those in table 3.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 6
EARNINGS FUNCTIONS ESTIMATES-PSID: INDUSTRY VS TENURE EFFECT
(Dependent Variable: Log of Real Hourly Labor Income ($1979))
Independent Variable (1)
(GLS)
(2)
(GLS)
(3)
(GLS)
(4)
(GLS)
Tenure 0.0142 0.0002 0.0017 0.0020
(0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0019)
Tenure
Squared -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Experience in Current
Industry(3-digit) - 0.0214 - -
(0.0024)
Experience in Industry
Squared(3-digit) - -0.0004 - -
(0.0001)
Experience in Current
Industry(2-digit) - - 0.0229 -
(0.0022)
Experience in Industry
Squared(2-digit) - - -0.0003 -
(0.0001)
Experience in Current
Industry(1-digit) - - - 0.0247
(0.0021)
Experience in Industry
Squared(1-digit) - - - -0.0004
(0.0001)
Potential Experience 0.0210 0.0182 0.0173 0.0170
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Potential Experience
Squared -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Indust. Dummies YES YES YES YES
Occup. Dummies YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.6679 0.6790 0.6808 0.6751
Notes-Other covariates include education in years, race, sex, regional, union coverage, marital status,
occupation, industry and year dummies. Standard errors are shown in parentheses (rounded to 0.0001
when smaller). Sample size is 15,480.
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TABLE 7
EARNINGS FUNCTIONS ESTIMATES-PSID: INDUSTRY VS TENURE EFFECT
(Dependent Variable: Log of Real Hourly Labor Income ($1979))
Independent Variable (1)
(IV-GLS)
(2)
(IV-GLS)
(3)
(IV-GLS)
(4)
(IV-GLS)
Tenure 0.0191 0.0051 0.0037 0.0041
(0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0027)
Tenure
Squared -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Experience in Current
Industry(3-digit) - 0.0202 - -
(0.0032)
Experience in Industry
Squared(3-digit) - -0.0003 - -
(0.0001)
Experience in Current
Industry(2-digit) - - 0.0247 -
(0.0029)
Experience in Industry
Squared(2-digit) - - -0.0004 -
(0.0001)
Experience in Current
Industry(1-digit) - - - 0.0258
(0.0029)
Experience in Industry
Squared(1-digit) - - - -0.0004
(0.0001)
Potential Experience 0.0189 0.0164 0.0154 0.0155
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Potential Experience
Squared -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Indust. Dummies YES YES YES YES
Occup. Dummies YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.6405 0.6382 0.6396 0.6451
Notes-Unshown covariates are the same as those in table 6.
Standard errors in parentheses. Sample size is 15,480.
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TABLE 8
INDUSTRY EFFECT (1-digit) VS TENURE EFFECT BY OCCUPATIONS-PSID
(Dependent Variable: log of Real Hourly Labor Income ($1979))
PROFESSIONALS, TECHNICAL WORKERS, MANAGERS AND ADMINISTRATORS
Independent Variable (1)
GLS
(2)
IV-GLS
(3)
GLS
(4)
IV-GLS
Tenure 0.0097 0.0126 0.0055 0.0061
(0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0039)
Tenure Squared -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Potential Experience 0.0340 0.0321 0.0315 0.0288
(0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0037)
Potent. Exp. Squared -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0005
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Experience in Industry - - 0.0118 0.0148
(0.0035) (0.0004)
Exp. in Industry Squared - - 0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0002)
R-Squared 0.6960 0.6640 0.7002 0.6666
Number of Observations 5,228
CLERICAL AND UNSKILLED WORKERS
Independent Variable (1)
GLS
(2)
IV-GLS
(3)
GLS
(4)
IV-GLS
Tenure 0.0172 0.0152 -0.0074 -0.0265
(0.0048) (0.0061) (0.0074) (0.0094)
Tenure Squared -0.0004 -0.0006 0.0003 0.0008
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Potential Experience 0.0081 0.0036 0.0056 -0.0007
(0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0049)
Potent. Exp. Squared -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0568)
Experience in Industry - - 0.0391 0.0568
(0.0085) (0.0108)
Exp. in Industry Squared - - -0.0009 -0.0016
(0.0003) (0.0003)
R-Squared 0.6632 0.6225 0.6785 0.6287
Number of Observations 1,382
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TABLE 8-continued
CRAFTSMEN AND KINDREDWORKERS, OPERATIVES AND LABORERS
Independent Variable (1)
GLS
(2)
IV-GLS
(3)
GLS
(4)
IV-GLS
Tenure 0.0160 0.0179 -0.0026 -0.0019
(0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0041)
Tenure Squared -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0005
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Potential Experience 0.0124 0.0117 0.0090 0.0091
(0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0026)
Potent. Exp. Squared -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Experience in Industry - - 0.0297 0.0298
(0.0031) (0.0042)
Exp. in Industry Squared - - -0.0007 -0.0007
(0.0001) (0.0002)
R-Squared 0.6541 0.6300 0.6658 0.6341
Number of Observations 7,200
SERVICE WORKERS
Independent Variable (1)
GLS
(2)
IV-GLS
(3)
GLS
(4)
IV-GLS
Tenure 0.0370 0.067 0.0267 0.0605
(0.0072) (0.0091) (0.0114) (0.0184)
Tenure Squared -0.0009 -0.0015 -0.0007 -0.0017
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Potential Experience -0.0004 -0.0092 -0.0079 -0.0140
(0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0062) -0.0069
Potent. Exp. Squared -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Experience in Industry - - 0.0249 0.0194
(0.0117) (0.0206)
Exp. in Industry Squared - - -0.0001 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0005)
R-Squared 0.4629 0.4529 0.4839 0.4584
Number of Observations 1,610
Notes-All regressions include industry and occupation dummies. Other unshown covariates are the
same as those in table 6. Standard errors in parentheses.
